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Leading al-Mahdī family personalities at Jazīra Abā, 14 February 1926 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī at the front, with ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl to his left 
(SAD.1/28/11) 
 
Introduction 
The story of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī – al-Mahdī Inc. – is one of a triangle of power: 
religion, politics and money. Its evolution during the turbulent early 20
th
 century 
was affected by what had happened before, not least the Mahdist wars of recent 
memory, and the impact of its enormous growth and political influence in the 
period before Sudan’s independence in 1956 is still felt today. The Dā’irat al-
Mahdī was the first agricultural company in Sudan whose management, 
                                                        
1 The author would like to thank Mrs Jane Hogan, Senior Assistant Keeper at the Sudan Archive, 
Professor Martyn Evans, Principal of Trevelyan College, and Professor James Piscatori, Head of the 
School of Government and International Affairs, for their assistance and hospitality during his tenure 
of the Luce Fellowship. 
administrative staff and workforce were exclusively Sudanese – and it grew 
beyond cotton growing to embrace industrial production, livestock, a substantial 
property portfolio and newspaper ownership. But above all, the legacy of the 
Dā’ira was social and political: as al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq has written, 
‘what distinguished the Dā’irat al-Mahdī … was the nature of the circumstances 
that had led to its establishment’ and its role during the ‘evolution of the first 
political pluralism in the country … [as] the financier for the activities of the Anṣār 
and the Umma Party’.
2
 
The Arabic word dā’ira itself simply means ‘circle’, but context gives it a 
useful flexibility. In politics, dā’irat al-intikhābāt is an ‘electoral circle’, a 
constituency. In the context of Sufi devotion, dā’irat al-ẓikr signifies a ‘circle of 
devotion’, joined in communal prayer or recitation. And in business, dā’ira has the 
sense of ‘enterprise’, perhaps on the lines of a round table in the boardroom. 
Where these ‘circles’ all overlap, in an individual or a group of people, the 
combination of financial muscle, spiritual commitment and political unity makes 
for a powerful force, in opposition to colonial rule or to indigenous military rule, 
or in a democratic majority. 
The second part of the name ties this triple force squarely to the al-
Mahdī clan, whose name arose from the claim of al-sheikh Muḥammad Aḥmad 
ʿAbdallah to be al-mahdī al-muntaẓar, the ‘Expected Guide’ who would reunite 
the Muslim global community ahead of the appearance of the Prophet Jesus and 
the End of Days.
3
 A well-educated religious leader, Muḥammad Aḥmad launched 
a jihād in 1881, rallied Sudan’s tribes and drove out Sudan’s Egyptian colonial 
occupiers four years later. In claiming the status of mahdī, he placed himself as 
direct successor to the Prophet Muḥammad – khalīfat rasūl Allah – and so above 
the entire hierarchy of the Ottoman caliphate, including the state-sponsored 
religious and legal scholars in Sudan known collectively as al-ʿulamāʾ. 
The Mahdī’s own family paid a high price for this mission. There were 
many fatalities in that era of jihād in the early 1880s, then in the further war of 
the late 1890s, when Britain invaded Sudan, and again in post-independence 
political violence. The Mahdī’s three brothers, Muḥammad, Hāmid and ʿAbdallah, 
                                                        
2 al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, ‘Ilāqāt al-intāj al-zirāʿīa fī mashārīʿ dā’irat al-Mahdī’ (‘Agricultural 
Means of Production in the Schemes of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī’), (Omdurman: Dirāsāt Istrātijīa, 2000), p. 
56. 
3 Fergus Nicoll, The Sword of the Prophet: The Mahdi of Sudan and the Death of General Gordon 
(Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2004). 
all died, as did his three deputies (khulafāʾ). Of the Mahdī’s own sons, 
Muḥammad, al-Bushra, al-Fāḍl, al-Ṣiddīq, al-Ṭayyib and al-Ṭāhir were all killed in 
conflict, executed or died of illness while incarcerated. That left just two sons, ʿAlī 
and ʿAbd-al-Raḥman – and the question of who would inherit the title of imām, or 
spiritual guide of the Mahdī’s extended community. 
 
 
al-Bushra al-Mahdī, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī and al-Fāḍl al-Mahdī, al-Shukkāba, August 1899 
(SAD.A1/191) 
 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī’s early years 
The story of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī began 34 years before its formal licensing, as 
Britain consolidated its grip over central and eastern Sudan. In August 1899, ʿAbd-
al-Raḥman, posthumous youngest son of the Mahdī, was with two of his brothers, 
al-Bushra and al-Fāḍl, at al-Shukkāba, near Wad Medani. After British troops 
intercepted what they believed to be an attempt to mobilise a counter-strike 
against occupation forces, al-Bushra and al-Fāḍl were shot by firing squad, 
following a summary court martial on charges of inciting resistance.
4
 ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman, recovering from a bullet wound in his shoulder, was taken under the 
wing of Muḥammad Ṭaha Shinqetti at Jazīrat al-Fīl, not far from al-Shukkāba, and 
                                                        
4 Report by Major H.G. Fitton of Military Intelligence, Sudan Intelligence Report 64 (18 July to 31 
August 1899), p. 2. 
there the boy continued his traditional education.
5
 All the older surviving male 
members of his family – including his now only brother, ʿAlī, were sent to prison in 
Wadi Halfa, Sudan’s northernmost town – or at Rashīd, in the Egyptian delta, 
where many died of tuberculosis and other symptoms of official neglect.
6
 
In 1908, as he entered his teens, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was forced by the 
British colonial authorities to move to Omdurman, under the close surveillance of 
the Intelligence Department. The boy brought with him an entire extended family 
of 72 dependents: widows and orphans of his father, brothers and uncles, and the 
relatives of those still in prison. A note from late December 1908 instructs Richard 
More, a Khartoum-based government Inspector, to issue 25 Egyptian pounds to 
build a compound of homes for the family.
7
 ʿAbd-al-Raḥman himself was taken 
under the guidance of two leading legal scholars, the Muftī of Sudan, Sheikh al-
Ṭayyib Aḥmad Hāshim, and the President of the Board of ʿUlamāʾ, Muḥammad al-
Badawī.
8
 This was a deliberate attempt to bring the symbol of religious rebellion 
under the control of the orthodox Islamic establishment. 
This was a threadbare existence, in which ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was an 
‘anxious suppliant for official doles on which he and his numerous dependents 
could subsist’, eking out a meagre allowance provided by the British.
9
 In October 
1909, Robin Bailey, a new appointee to the Sudan Political Service, was taken on a 
tour of Omdurman by the local District Commissioner: 
 
He led the way through squalid lanes to an insignificant mud hut 
and rapped on the door with his riding crop. Out came an 
                                                        
5 ‘The Forgotten Generation’, in K.D.D. Henderson Papers, Sudan Archive, University of Durham 
(henceforth SAD), 661/4, f.35. Mubārak ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl recalled seeing the scar in his great-uncle’s 
shoulder; interview, 8 May 2013. 
6 In his memoirs, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī recalled the harsh treatment meted out to family members 
held captive by the British at Wadi Halfa in northern Sudan, where ‘the cold, shortage of food and 
diseases decimated all my brothers … who died, one after the other, of tuberculosis’; al-Sādiq al-Mahdī 
(ed.), Jihād fī sabīl al-istiqlāl (Khartoum: Government Press, 1966), p. 12. See also Hassan Ahmed 
Ibrahim, ‘The Policy of the Condominium Government towards the Mahdist Political Prisoners, 1898-
1932’, Sudan Notes and Records 55 (1974): 33-45. 
7 Inspectorate-General to Intelligence, 29 December 1908, in G.F. Thomas Papers, SAD 321/5 (no 
folio). On R.E. More, see Harold MacMichael, Sudan Political Service, 1899-1956 (Oxford: Oxonian 
Press, n.d.), p. 11. 
8 Richard Hill, Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan (Oxford, OUP, 1969), pp. 253 and 354. 
9 Symes to Lampson, 13 May 1935; National Archives, FO 371/19096 (no folio). On Symes, see 
‘Monthly Return of Senior Officials, Sudan Government, and British Officers Temporarily Employed in 
Sudan Government Service, Showing Appointments & Stations on the 1st March, 1914, and Probable 
Moves during the Month’; Durham University Library, Sud.A.Ref PK 1543 SUD. 
obsequious, sorry looking youth in soiled clothes. He was the 
Mahdiis [sic] son. He had no means of livelihood and received a 
compassionate grant of a few pounds a month.
10
 
 
In the first decade of the 20
th
 century, such abject conditions were shared by 
many surviving Mahdists, by anyone, in fact, who was part of a community that 
was ‘disbanded and prohibited from reforming’.
11
 But there were two specific 
reasons why ʿAbd-al-Raḥman as an individual was kept in deliberate poverty and 
obscurity. One was personal. Rudolf von Slatin, an Austrian, had been one of 
many European and American mercenaries working for the Egyptian occupation. 
As Governor of Darfur, he was defeated by the Mahdī’s forces in the west and 
forced to surrender. He spent the next 11 years as a prisoner, mostly in 
Omdurman under the eye of the Mahdī’s autocratic successor, the Khalīfa 
ʿAbdullāhi. Slatin eventually escaped – and published (with no little help from 
British military intelligence) a lurid account of the horrors of the Khalīfa’s rule – a 
book that became one of the ‘set texts’ for early British military and civilian 
officials working in Sudan.
12
 
When Britain completed the second conquest of Sudan in 1899, Slatin 
found a job as Inspector-General.
13
 He lost no time in suppressing anyone with 
links to the administration that had kept him in chains.
14
 One account claims that 
Slatin ‘succumbed to fits of black depression’ and as a result ‘incalculated [sic] an 
unjustified fear of a Mahdiist revival and urged the necessity of repressing the 
actual Mahdiist tribe.’
15
 Slatin’s biographer, Richard Hill, noted that the policy 
towards the Mahdists was ‘of necessity repressive’ but insisted that Slatin ‘set his 
                                                        
10 R.E.H. Bailey Papers, SAD 533/4/27. 
11 Richard Hill, Slatin Pasha (Oxford: OUP, 1965), p. 90. 
12 Peter Woodward, ‘In the Footsteps of Gordon: The Sudan Government and the Rise of Sayyid Sir 
Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, 1915-1935’, African Affairs 84/334 (1985), p. 40. See also Gabriel Warburg, 
‘The Wingate Literature Revisited: The Sudan as Seen by Members of the Sudan Political Service during 
the Condominium: 1899-1956, Middle Eastern Studies 41/3 (2005), pp. 373-389. 
13 This office (mufattish al-ʿamm) was separate from Intelligence (mukhabarāt). 
14 ‘Memorandum on the Policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist Cult’, by R. Davies, 
A.D.I. [Acting Director of Intelligence] Khartoum, dated 11 December 1926, National Archives, FO 
371/12374, p. 3. Ned Mayall described the process by which surviving sons of the Khalīfa ʿAbdullāhi 
and their families were transported up the White Nile and dumped in rudimentary settlements in 
isolated bush-country, where they were terrorised by lions; R.C. Mayall Papers, SAD 851/7, ff. 17-19. 
15 R.E.H. Bailey Papers, SAD 533/4, f. 23. 
face firmly against persecution while being very strict at times with the younger 
generation and particularly with the sons of the Mahdi and Khalifa’.
16
 
One important aspect of Slatin’s suppression policy was to insist that 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman be called strictly by given name and patronymic – and 
emphatically not given the special honorific al-Sayyid, which denotes descent 
from the family of the Prophet Muḥammad and which would have identified him 
as his father’s spiritual and political successor.
17
 As de facto head of the family, 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was the living representative of a substantial religious force – 
what remained from the huge following commanded by his father. Similarly 
proscribed, then, was the little prayer-book called al-Rātib, containing quotations 
from the Koran and Sufi devotional declarations to Allah. For the Mahdī, who led 
a military, social and spiritual jihād, the Rātib was a powerful communal binding 
agent: all the more reason for the British – and their collaborators among the 
Sudanese religious elite – to fear its power in the hands of the Mahdī’s heir.
18
 For 
many years after the British occupation, even having a copy of the Rātib was 
banned – and reading from it in public was a criminal offence.
19
 
In terms of allies, the British were much more inclined to trust people 
like al-Sayyid ʿAlī al-Mīrghanī and al-Sharīf Yūsuf al-Hindī, heads of the Khatmīa 
and Hindīa sects respectively.
20
 The latter was a staunch supporter of the Anglo-
Egyptian government, even though he had served the Mahdī and his successor. al-
Mīrghanī, by contrast, had always maintained his loyalty to the previous Egyptian 
occupation, in the face of the Mahdī’s jihād. Indeed, the Khatmīa were among a 
substantial minority who rejected the call of the Mahdī and had no reason to 
further the aspirations of his son. As Lord Kitchener himself had put it just a year 
after the conquest had been achieved: ‘The task before us all … is to acquire the 
                                                        
16 Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 139. The policy was also hypocritical, as Slatin was on record as saying that the 
death of the Khalīfa in 1899 had ‘implied the end of the Mahdist movement’ and was ‘equivalent to 
the instant and permanent pacification of the Sudan’; St James’s Budget, 8 December 1899, and New 
York Evening Post, 14 December 1899, in R.C. von Slatin Papers, SAD 410/19, ff. 17 and 19. 
17 Letter dated 28 December 1908, in G.F. Thomas Papers, SAD 321/5 (no folio). 
18 When the Intelligence Department asked a ‘learned Mohammedan lawyer’ to vet the Rātib for 
seditious content, he commented: ‘I was greatly astonished to find that it was void in every respect of 
any call to Mahdism and I began to think his object was to call the people to follow him as Sheikh of a 
tarīqa and not as the Mahdi’; The Religious Confraternities (Tariqas), by C.A. Willis, Sudan Intelligence 
Department, 1922, p. 17. 
19 Gabriel Warburg, ‘Religious Policy in the Northern Sudan: ‘Ulama’ and Sufism 1899-1918’, Asian and 
African Studies 7 (1971), pp. 89-119. 
20 Gabriel Warburg, ‘Sectarian Politics in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: The Neo-Mahdism Reconsidered’, 
Sudan Notes and Records 3 (1999), pp. 89-104. 
confidence of the people … by being thoroughly in touch with the better class of 
native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole 
population.’
21
 As for ʿAbd-al-Raḥman, as Richard Hill noted, the government 
‘regarded him as a poor third and scarcely noticed his existence.’
22
 
 
 
ʿAbd-al-Qādir Muḥammad wad Habūba under guard, al-Jazīra, 1908 
(SAD.A38/173) 
 
There were indeed serial rebellions during the early years of British rule – 
generally small and isolated, but making sure that the fear of a wider uprising 
never quite went away. Among the most serious revolts were those led by ʿAlī 
ʿAbd-al-Karīm in 1900, by Sharīf Muḥammad al-Amīn in 1903, by ʿAbd-al-Qādir 
Muḥammad wad Habūba in 1908, and by Muḥammad Sayyid Muḥammad in 
1919.
23
 The British certainly knew that there were many tens, probably hundreds 
of thousands of people who had heard the Mahdī’s call in the mid-1880s and 
                                                        
21 G.M.A. Bakheit, ‘British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism, 1919-1939’ (Cambridge: PhD 
thesis, 1965), p. 24. 
22 Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 137. 
23 Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, ‘Mahdist Risings against the Condominium Government in the Sudan, 1900-
1927’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 12/3 (1979), pp. 440-71. On ʿAlī ʿAbd-al-Karīm, 
see ‘Note on the Millennium sect in the Sudan’, in A.R.C. Bolton Papers, SAD 624/4, ff. 2-3. On Sharīf 
Muḥammad al-Amīn, see Appendix A: ‘Rise and Fall of a new Mahdi in Kordofan’, in Sudan Intelligence 
Report 110, September 1903, pp. 2-3. On ʿAbd-al-Qādir Muḥammad wad Habūba, see Hill, 
Biographical Dictionary, p. 14. 
were still alive in the early 20
th
 century. The Mahdī had called them Anṣār, 
‘followers’, a deliberate reference to those who had followed the Prophet 
Muḥammad in his lifetime. Those who travelled from far and wide to swear 
loyalty and serve the cause he called muhajirīn – they had emulated the hijra of 
the Prophet and his successor the Mahdī – and these two terms will crop up again 
in the world of what became known as ‘neo-Mahdism’. 
 
Farming begins at Jazīra Abā 
Jazīra Abā, or Abā Island, about 150 miles south of Khartoum, is the heartland of 
the Mahdist movement: in the 1880s, under colonial rule and today. When ʿAbd-
al-Raḥman was young, the island was densely forested. His first assertion of 
independence from Slatin’s lock-down in Omdurman came when he was given 
permission to travel to Jazīra Abā to supervise the clearance of a patch of land he 
had been granted two years earlier, though not allowed to visit.
24
 In his short 
history, Jazīra Abā and its Role in the Sudanese Renaissance, al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī 
wrote that it was wad Habūba’s revolt just months earlier that had ‘confirmed to 
the foreign rulers that under the surface the feelings of the Anṣār were strong and 
potentially explosive, and the policy of pressurising them would lead to more such 
explosions’.
25
 
Slatin wrote to his colleagues in the Intelligence branch in January 1909 
to ask: ‘Will you give AbdelRahman Ibn Mohd Ahmed a free pass & back to Fasch 
Shoya [a railway halt on the west bank of the White Nile facing the island]?’
26
 
Emery at Intelligence agreed, writing in turn to the Governor of White Nile 
Province: ‘AbdelRahman son of the Mahdi proceeds to Fochi Shoya on 24
th
 inst & 
has been given free warrants … from this office for himself & two servants. He is 
anxious to be granted a loan to work a Sakia [sāqiya, a mechanical water-wheel 
                                                        
24 al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, ‘Ilāqāt al-intāj al-zirāʿīa, pp. 61-2, describes how ʿAbd-al-Raḥman 
had been given permission to farm the plot in 1906 but had to wait two years to be allowed to travel 
to oversee the land clearance. This section also describes ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s ‘emotional attachment’ to 
Jazīra Abā and quotes his expression of determination to return to ‘the base of my activities to forge 
relations with the Anṣār and to mobilise them around the teachings of religion, as well as reviving the 
heritage of their forefathers’. 
25 al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, al-Jazīra Abā wa-dawrahā fī nahdhat al-Sūdāni (‘Jazīra Abā and its Role in the 
Sudanese Renaissance’) (Khartoum: Government Press, 1965), p. 7. 
26 Letter dated 18 January 1909, in G.F. Thomas Papers, SAD 321/5 (no folio). 
powered by livestock] of his in Aba Island, & I shall be much obliged if assistance 
can be rendered to him.’
27
 
So began the period known to Anṣār as al-balṭa, after the axe used to 
clear woods and scrubland.
28
 The combination of logging and farming served 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman well for several years, weaning him off government handouts and 
loans and enabling him to embark on a steady expansion of his smallholdings. It 
was not entirely straightforward: other islanders who were already grazing the 
land allocated to ʿAbd-al-Raḥman disputed his right to take it. Finally, the British 
Inspector at Kosti ruled that any land satisfactorily developed at the end of five 
years would be ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s in perpetuity.
29
 So, in November 1910, Slatin 
wrote again to Intelligence: ‘Abdel Rahman ebn Mohd Ahmed leaves for Abba to 
… improve his cultivation – can you give a loan of 6 pounds and deduct from his 
salary gradually.’
30
 
By late 1914, these winter trips from Omdurman to Jazīra Abā had 
become routine, each lasting around a month, usually with free travel passes 
courtesy of British Intelligence. Surveillance, however, was not relaxed. A note 
from the Intelligence Department in November 1914 to the Governor of White 
Nile Province at al-Dueim records that ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was ‘proceeding to visit his 
cultivation’ on Jazīra Abā. ‘He has been instructed to report himself to you & to 
Inspector Kosti. … He has on this occasion been especially instructed as to his 
manner of behaviour & I trust yourself & the Inspector Kosti will be satisfied … 
without letting AbdelRahman observe that he is being watched.’
31
 
While his family and early followers on the island became self-sufficient 
in food, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman also secured contracts to sell his timber to the Sudan 
Railway Department, whose trains were left short of fuel by the diversion of 
                                                        
27 Letter dated 19 January 1909, in ibid. In subsequent correspondence on the same theme, the 
Intelligence department asks on 3 August 1910 ‘whether the presence of A. Mohd. Ahmed is really 
necessary’. The following day, C.E. Lyall, Assistant Governor, White Nile Province, replies cautiously: ‘It 
is certainly advisable that AbdelRahman Mohd Ahmed should go to Aba Island & superintend the 
erection of Saquias there. If he really intends to erect them’; in ibid. 
28 al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, ‘Ilāqāt al-intāj al-zirāʿīa, p. 62. 
29 al-Ṣādiq al-Mahdī, al-Jazīra Abā, p. 8. In the aftermath of the British occupation, the question of land 
ownership was a priority area. The first Governor-General, Lord Kitchener, warned as early as March 
1899 that ‘ordinances will shortly be issued providing for adjudication’ on conflicting land claims, and 
that, ‘pending such adjudication, no intending vendor of land in the Sudan is in a position to give a 
good and valid title to such land’; The Sudan Gazette, No. 1, 7 March 1899, p. 4. The first Title to Lands 
Ordinance (1899) was issued by proclamation two months later; The Sudan Gazette, No. 2, 27 May 
1899, p. 1. Such legislation was periodically revisited during the early years of Condominium rule. 
30 Slatin to A.D.I., 19 November 1910, in G.F. Thomas Papers, SAD 321/5 (no folio). 
31 Letter dated 22 November 1914, in ibid. 
timber to the Western Front, and to government steamers using the White Nile 
on the north-south route – to the irritation of the Forestry Department, which 
believed it had prior claim to the timber.
32
 
 
We lent ʿAbd-al-Raḥman 20 Egyptian pounds worth of tools to 
fulfil a timber contract, only to find that he kept the tools, 
reneged on the contract and sold the timber to two other 
government departments at a greatly enhanced price. Having 
regard to the political status of this person, I should be glad to 
know how far I may go in compelling him to pay his debts.
33
  
 
Four years later, the contract was still running: the Governor-General’s own 
steamer moored at Jazīra Abā’s ‘wood station’ to replenish her ‘barge of ship 
wood’ for the journey south up the White Nile.
34
 
 
 
Boats loaded with timber, White Nile Province 
(SAD.878/6/14) 
 
                                                        
32 Ṣalāh Ḥassan, al-Sayyid ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl al-Mahdī (Atbara: Wādī al-Nīl University, PhD thesis, n.d.), 
p. 61. 
33 Letter dated 18 June 1917, in G.F. Thomas Papers, SAD 321/5 (no folio). 
34 ‘Governor-General’s inspection tour South of Khartoum’, entry for 6-7 March 1921, in L. Martin 
Papers, SAD 627/3, f. 3. 
Collaboration or manipulation? 
This ability to work the system was an early sign of ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s core 
pragmatism: the defining principle of neo-Mahdism, which one Sudanese scholar 
has likened simply to ‘the projection of his personal influence, wealth and 
prestige’.
35
 Young, not yet centre-stage but already comfortable, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman 
gave all the appearance of collaboration with the tarbush-wearing colonial 
establishment –– but at the same time engaged in a covert but systematic 
development of the family and the growing community of Anṣār. In fact, it would 
be hard to state the position any more clearly than ʿAbd-al-Raḥman did himself in 
conversation with Reginald Davies of the Intelligence Department in September 
1924: Davies quoted him as stressing that 
 
all the Mahdists whom he controlled were pro-Government to a man 
and that this attitude was due solely to his influence. He had imposed 
this attitude on them, he said with great emphasis, solely because he 
regarded the English as the power which could best serve the interests of 
the sect.
36
 
 
This was a period when the British were turning increasingly to what was called 
‘Native Administration’, which relied on tribal figures – graced with approved 
titles such as sheikh, nāẓir, and ʿomda – who carried out much of the local 
administration on behalf of their conquerors.
37
 The British were anxious when 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman tried to woo these rival indigenous authorities to his own cause. 
A report from Ian Bruce-Gardyne, Assistant District Commissioner at al-Geteina in 
Kordofan in May 1923 describes ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s efforts to increase his 
influence among local dignitaries by inviting them to a meeting. The official 
perceptively sums up the inherent risks: 
 
It seemed to me … impossible that he who does not hold any 
apparent official position could be allowed to invite any one 
working for the Govt. away from his duty without consulting the 
                                                        
35 Bakheit, ‘British Administration’, p. 117. 
36 ‘Note of a Conversation with El Seiyed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi, 14.9.24’, by R. Davies, A.D.I., in 
National Archives, FO 141/573/1, f. 53. 
37 Tim Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 1898-1985 (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1987), pp. 52-5. 
local authority. Up till then it would have been impossible to have 
allowed two of the above omdas to be absent without severely 
hindering Govt. work, while to refuse leave to attend the 
summons of a noted religious leader was to put an unfair strain 
on their loyalty. I was afraid too that … a large assembly organized 
under their chiefs was being gathered under one man, who would 
become their “uncrowned king” if not more.
38
 
 
As early as 1915, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was given the best possible opportunity to 
improve his position with the government. During the First World War, the 
government in Khartoum had to counter the threat posed by Turkey’s call for a 
pan-Islamic jihād, and called upon ‘leaders of popular Islam … to utilise their 
influence in pacifying the populace’.
39
 In other words, the British needed ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman precisely for the religious status that it had been denying for the past 16 
years – but, as Richard Hill put it, ‘This was no time to argue theological 
niceties.’
40
 The war also removed Slatin, an Austrian, from the scene – and the 
rules began to change, albeit cautiously. Within three months, officials were using 
the title that Slatin had proscribed. In December the same year, George Iles at 
Wad Medani was alerted by the Assistant Director of Intelligence to an imminent 
trip by ‘Sayed Abdel Rahman, the son of the Mahdi, to the White and Blue Niles’, 
a mission ‘specially sanctioned by His Excellency the Governor-General. … While 
granting every facility for this visit, I should be grateful if you would kindly keep 
him under eye –and his moves and statements, etc., reported secretly to me.’
41
 
Touring the Jazīra region to reassure his fellow Sudanese that Britain was 
not waging a war against Islam looked like collaboration but it allowed ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman to show himself to his followers – who naturally assumed that he had the 
endorsement of the British in reclaiming some version at least of his father’s 
leadership role. And ʿAbd-al-Raḥman justified his role in this campaign against 
Turkish propaganda with a reminder of the Ottoman Empire’s history in Sudan, 
seen in the Egyptian occupation of 1820-1885: ‘No-one should expect me to 
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sympathise with the Turkish Sultan. The history of the Turks since they found their 
way to the Sudan had been written in the blood of my people and followers.’
42
 
This policy of quasi-collaboration secured him an audience with the King 
in London, a chestful of British honours, and the close, if not always trusting, 
attention of decades of imperial administrators. As early as 1921, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman 
was holding political meetings at his house; at one of these, a document 
‘addressed to the two Condominium Governments’ was signed, in which the 
signatories stated that they ‘preferred to be under one only of the two partners … 
i.e. the British’.
43
 The historian Hasan Abdin called this ‘a tribute to the success 
and reciprocity of collaboration between a colonial regime and a “national 
aristocracy”’.
44
 But al-Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman – as he was by now almost 
universally known, and increasingly openly acknowledged as imām of the Anṣār – 
had his own agenda, one of exploiting every opportunity to improve his position 
with the government.
45
  
He abstained from taking any active role in the 1916 British annexation 
of the Darfur Sultanate, despite the huge number of known Mahdist supporters in 
the west – or, more likely, because he knew that Darfur’s reintegration into Sudan 
proper would open access to a larger following. He also profited from increasingly 
open divisions between the ‘co-domini’, Britain and Egypt, always lining himself 
up as the loyal servant of the former. On 23 April 1919 and on 10 June 1924 – two 
peak periods for Egyptian nationalism and therefore British anxiety – ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman was involved in collective declarations of loyalty to British rule. On the 
second occasion, he was the lead signatory, above the Mufti of Sudan but still, 
with disingenuous modesty, identified simply as a ‘Cultivator’.
46
 Yet when 
Governor-General Sir Geoffrey Archer made an official visit to Jazīra Abā on 14 
February 1926, officialdom in Khartoum was still so suspicious of ʿAbd-al-Raḥman 
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that Archer’s Council was able to engineer his resignation and force his return to 
London.
47
 
 
The failure of containment 
British policy on neo-Mahdism was never consistent: each successive 
administration had both sympathisers and sceptics, who presented conflicting 
assessments. In November 1925, the Intelligence Department insisted that ‘the 
movement is undoubtedly of a potentially dangerous character’. To ‘remove him 
[ʿAbd-al-Raḥman] elsewhere’ risked disturbances: better to ‘treat him with 
firmness but also with the greatest personal consideration and respect, as the 
best means of preserving the loyalty of his followers.’
48
 Back from the senior army 
commander in Sudan, Major-General Hubert Huddleston, came the riposte: ‘A 
general Mahdist uprising postulates the presence of a Mahdi, who will come 
openly into the field, assume personal control, and be prepared to head his men 
in battle. These are not the characteristics of the present head of the Mahdist 
movement who is no warrior.’
49
 The general almost certainly had no idea how 
accurately his assessment matched that of ʿAbd-al-Raḥman himself. 
By the early 1920s, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was already entertaining in style in 
his mansions in Khartoum, Omdurman and Jazīra Abā. By 1935, he was the owner 
of at least 15,000 acres – and the accounts from a third of that land showed an 
annual return of between 20,000 and 30,000 Egyptian pounds.
50
 Inasmuch as 
there was any consistent British counter-strategy to resist this inexorable 
expansion, it was, as James Robertson later put it, that ‘if he could be persuaded 
to devote his energies to agriculture and cotton growing, he might be less inclined 
to develop his religious and political influence throughout the country.’
51
 
                                                        
47 Archer’s own account of this debacle is in Sir Geoffrey Archer, Personal and Historical Memoirs of an 
East African Administrator (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd Ltd., 1963), pp. 239-56. 
48 Geoffrey Archer to Lord Lloyd, 18 November 1925, in National Archives, FO 141/573/1, ff. 91-2. 
49 ‘Notes on the Possibility of a Mahdist Rising in the Sudan Necessitating the employment of External 
Reinforcements’, by Maj.-Gen. Hubert Huddleston, 8 August 1926, in National Archives, FO 141/573/1, 
ff. 126-8. See also Henry Keown-Boyd, Soldiers of the Nile: A Biographical History of the British Officers 
of the Egyptian Army 1882-1925 (Thornbury: Thornbury Press, 1996), p. 103. 
50 al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, ‘Ilāqāt al-intāj al-zirāʿīa, p. 63. 
51 Sir James Robertson, Transition in Africa (London: Hurst & Co., 1974), p. 33; see also Niblock, Class 
and Power in Sudan, pp. 50-1, on the commercial advantages accruing to strongly centralized 
movements. 
Put more pithily by a neo-Mahdist writer, this amounted to a policy of 
‘siege and distraction through commercial gain’.
52
 But precisely because he was 
not distracted, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s political and religious strength – which helped 
build and was then sustained by the edifice of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī – increased by 
manipulating the system. His own view was always couched in the pragmatic 
language of the trader: ‘If someone owes you money and offers you half, wouldn’t 
you take it and then press for more?’ That was his view on progress – both in 
terms of his personal status and, later, wider political rights for Sudanese.
53
 In his 
memoir, the journalist Muḥammad Kheir al-Badawī called this ‘wisdom and 
cunning’: a revival of his father’s revolution but ‘free of religious obsessions’.
54
 
 
 
Construction of the Sennār Dam, 1923-5 
(SAD.632/16/31) 
 
Beginning of the cotton empire 
The construction of the Sennār Dam on the Blue Nile in the 1920s was a pivotal 
moment for Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman. Not only did he secure lucrative sub-
contracts for the timber needed to build workers’ accommodation, offices and 
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related dam infrastructure, but he was exposed for the first time to the 
revolutionary idea that cotton could be the making of Sudan – and any Sudanese 
in the business of cotton. At the dam’s grand opening in January 1926, his was 
again the first name on a list of ‘Distinguished Notabilities of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan’.
55
 These dignitaries, noted The Sudan Herald, ‘garbed in gorgeous robes 
heavy with decorations, made a vivid array of blue, gold and scarlet against a 
background of thousands of white robed natives who made the further bank of 
the canal appear a snow-clad hill dotted with coal.’
56
 
Just ten days after that ceremony, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman secured a 
government loan of 4,500 Egyptian pounds to begin cotton cultivation on Jazīra 
Abā – a loan that was never repaid because, after he had held out for two years, 
friends in high places ensured that the loan became a gift, which ‘should not be 
collected back from the Sayed’.
57
 Further effective state subsidy followed when 
al-Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman became a partner in the government cotton scheme at 
Qundāl, on the Blue Nile. Khartoum put in 28,000 pounds, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman 
contributed ‘general administration and supervision’ – and the huge profits were 
shared. 
To achieve their full potential, large cotton schemes demanded 
industrial-scale irrigation, and ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī become one of a small 
elite of private pump-station owners on the White Nile. In 1927, a nine-year-old 
application for permission to use water pumps was finally approved – another 
shift in the political winds in Khartoum – and the Sudan Cotton Growers’ 
Association history confirms that this, ‘the first private pump scheme in Sudan 
was started in 1929 at Aba Island‘.
58
 It was experimental, inasmuch as no-one had 
tried growing cotton on the White Nile before: the Sennār Dam channelled Blue 
Nile water to the massive, government-controlled Gezira Scheme.
59
 But ʿAbd-al-
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Raḥman’s initial 180-acre project on Jazīra Abā was a ‘great success’, delivering a 
healthy yield of long-fibre cotton.
60
 
This was the beginning of a rapid expansion and the birth of a multi-
faceted business enterprise. Before long, al-Mahdī family farms – each headed by 
a leading member of the extended family – were not only growing but trading 
cotton, buying up the produce of smaller private schemes in the region that did 
not have their own processing facilities.
61
 So ʿAbd-al-Raḥman and his extended 
family had control of both production and exchange, and the spectacular profits 
were re-invested in factories, oil mills, new trading partnerships or new 
agricultural ventures. Extra income came from the family’s ginning plants – the 
biggest at Rabak – whose excess capacity was rented out to the smaller cotton 
schemes in the area.
62
 Another important role was as a finance house for local 
small-holders outside the family: al-Mahdī Inc. lent money for tractors, seed, 
small pumps, and so on – a ‘means of empowerment for Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s 
followers’, as one family member put it.
63
 
This expansion put ʿAbd-al-Raḥman in the company of Sudan’s merchant 
princes, most of whom were expatriates.
64
 Gerasimos Contomichalos, a well-
connected businessman and part of Sudan’s large Greek community, was a 
particularly close associate.
65
 Another prominent member of the Sudan Chamber 
of Commerce, Azīz Kafūri, sold him his first town-house in Khartoum as early as 
1918.
66
 Indeed, there are some who believe that the expatriate private business 
elite, many of them from the Levant and so collectively known to Sudanese as al-
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Shuwām or ‘the Syrians’, were instrumental in building ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s profile, 
perhaps investing in him as their own best chance for stability in some 
unpredictable era after the British.
67
 
 
 
Baling cotton at a ginning factory 
(SAD.1/18/20) 
 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman reaches out to the West 
These growing projects demanded a huge labour force, and here Sayyid ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman’s religious authority meshed well with his commercial concerns. Put 
simply, he could count on a massive number of people being willing to work for 
him for little beyond board and lodging, and the privilege of being close to the son 
of the Mahdi: ‘belila wa baraka’, as it has been put, ‘porridge and a blessing’.
68
 
This phenomenon was explained by al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, author of the 
only published article on the Dā’irat al-Mahdī: 
 
Psychological desire and a spirit of sectarian loyalty to Mahdism 
played a large part in prompting farmers to work with disregard 
for financial returns and turn a blind eye to any shortcomings. … 
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For them, the migration meant the continuation of the cause of 
jihād and an extension of the Mahdist revolutionary movement.
69
 
 
As many as 15,000 people a year travelled from Kordofan, Darfur and beyond to 
the White Nile to work for Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman on this basis.
70
 The scale of 
migration reveals that there was much more than employment involved. 
Throughout the 1920s, Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman reached out to his father’s large 
following in the west – newly accessible after the British annexation of Darfur. 
Access may also have been improved by the fact that ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s mother 
was the niece of the ousted Sultan.
71
 al-Tijāni Muṣṭafa Muḥammad Sālih has 
recorded the extent of ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s outreach among the Zaghāwa tribe in 
Darfur: 
 
Many Zaghāwa answered the imām’s request to leave their 
homes and children and migrate to Jazīra Abā to learn the 
recitation of the Rātib and to worship in Masjid al-Kūn, which the 
anṣār believed to be particularly graceful. The majority of those 
Zaghāwa who made hijra had abandoned their possessions and 
families for the sake of religion and devoted themselves to the 
dā’ira. They worked as labourers in cotton and sorghum 
cultivation and in cutting firewood free of charge in the belief that 
they would be rewarded in the hereafter. … [and] they considered 
those who remained at home and refused to join the imām as lax 
in religion.
72
 
 
Elsewhere in Darfur, the Sultan of Dār Masālīt, piqued by the loss of so many 
followers in the seasonal migration to Jazīra Abā – where they received only a 
modest amount of grain as reward for their labour – appealed to the British for 
help. According to one report, 
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73
 
 
The imām himself rejected the charge of exploitation, let alone slave labour. He 
insisted that the set-up was both paternalistic and positive: 
 
The flood of Anṣār rushing to Jazīra Aba, abandoning homes, 
families and properties, did not do so to work in agriculture or 
other things. They came to hear a word from me, declaring the 
revolution against foreign rule. [But] I looked at matters from a 
different angle. I perceived the armed struggle as doomed to fail. I 
viewed discarding life as a defeat, which I did not accept because I 
saw it as my duty to preserve the heritage and legacy of 
Mahdism, so that this page of our history would not be lost. Their 
aim was hijra and jihād, as their fathers had done to be with the 
Mahdī – and I channelled this strong spirit of devotion and 
combat towards construction.
74
 
 
This devoted following gave ʿAbd-al-Raḥman another lucrative income stream: the 
zakāt, or tribute, that Anṣār felt obliged to render to the Mahdi’s heir.
75
 These 
gifts, usually in kind, in the form of grain consignments, livestock or even land, 
added hugely to the family’s wealth. al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq conceded 
that such tributes were ‘among the most important means of capital 
accumulation within the company’ but admitted that ‘we have no information 
showing how the Anṣār’s zakāt was spent after it reached the Dā’ira’. In February 
1924, when George Dupuis, Deputy Governor of Darfur, asked for an accounting 
of the proceeds of zakāt, the reply came: £E 2,500 in sorghum and cattle. In his 
account, al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq admitted that ‘this amount was probably 
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a lot less than the truth’.
76
 In November 1931, Richard Owen, a White Nile 
Province official, rejected ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s claims to several farm properties that 
he said had been donated by religious followers: 
 
In most cases he has only obtained permission by intimating to 
the owner that he would very much like the plot, & the wretched 
owner, unless a definite anti-Mahdist, does not like to incur his 
displeasure & religious ban by refusing; - & when he does acquire 
the land he seldom employs local labour on it, but plants his nasty 
fanatical westerner adherents on it, who thieve & brawl, & are a 
far more potential source of religious upheaval than any Mahdist 
elements of the Sudan itself.
77
 
 
Such loyalty also put both donors of zakāt and muhājirīn at odds with their own 
tribal leaders, many of whom resisted the spread of ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s influence. A 
muhājir might bring a camel to Jazīra Abā but then be fined another camel on his 
return to Kordofan or Darfur. ʿAbd-al-Raḥman turned this to his own advantage by 
telling the British it was fairer on such devotees for his own agents (manādib) to 
collect the zakāt discreetly, and ‘save the donors from the enmity of their tribal 
leaders which the mere fact of the gift would bring down on them’.
78
  
On that point about agents, it is worth stressing the scale of ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman’s ambitions. He had been sending out probes as early as 1916 and by the 
mid-1920s he had a network spread across White Nile, Blue Nile, Kordofan, Darfur 
and beyond. In 1923, the British were worried enough to circulate fliers warning 
that ‘the Government did not recognise ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdi [omitting his 
title “al-Sayyid”] as anything but an ordinary citizen; and that … anybody 
purporting to collect in his name, either in cash or kind, would be liable to arrest 
by the local or district authority’.
79
 By 1924, he admitted to employing 24 agents, 
with only one temporarily assigned to Darfur: certainly a considerable 
understatement of the real situation.
80
 This is what he gave as their job 
                                                        
76 al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, ‘Ilāqāt al-intāj al-zirāʿīa, p. 68. For Dupuis, see MacMichael, Sudan 
Political Service, p. 21. 
77 Letter dated 25 November 1931, in T.R.H. Owen Papers, SAD 414/3/35-6. 
78 ‘Note of a Conversation’, FO 141/573/1, ff. 52-3. 
79 Bedri and Hogg, Babikr Bedri, Vol. 2, p. 274. 
80 ‘Memorandum’, FO 371/12374, p. 11. See also Awad al-Sid al-Karsani, ‘The Establishment of Neo-
Mahdism in the Western Sudan, 1920-1936’, African Affairs 86/344 (1987), pp. 395-8. 
description, beyond acting as commercial and agricultural agents: ‘They represent 
me in all affairs with local governors … and in all interests I have with natives and 
are entrusted with anything that the natives wish to transmit to me.’
81
 
 
 
Stacked sacks of cotton seed, al-Jazīra 
(SAD.1/25/2) 
 
These emissaries pushed further even than the western frontier of British-
occupied Sudan. British officials in northern Nigeria complained about letters 
from ʿAbd-al-Raḥman that claimed explicitly ‘I am following in the footsteps of my 
father’ and urged Muslims in West Africa to make the hijra to Jazīra Abā. If they 
fell by the wayside, he assured them, ‘Allah will give them everlasting bliss’.
82
 This, 
commented one official in Nigeria tetchily, amounted to a ‘very considerable and 
very nefarious’ influence.
83
 
The influx added to the chores faced by the Kosti District Commissioner 
and his staff. One job was to count the huts on Jazīra Abā that housed the faithful 
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in settlements demarcated for the Zaghāwa, Rizeigāt, Beni Hassan, and so on. 
‘There were about 6000 huts in 1936,’ recalled Bill Henderson, ‘and as they 
always showed an increase and nobody ever did anything about it … the Sub-
Governor of the White Nile persuaded the powers that were to discontinue this 
vexatious practice.’ And if that weren’t enough to drive a young colonial officer to 
the whisky bottle, the Kosti D.C. also had ‘the unenviable task of assessing the 
profits of the Daira … After laborious days in their accounts office he would 
produce figures which were completely nullified by information in the possession 
of the Finance Department in Khartoum.’
84
 
A routine tax inspection by Ian Douglas, a Khartoum-based Audit 
Inspector, revealed the extent to which the British administration was struggling 
to keep up with both the al-Mahdī family’s devious accounting and the mass 
movement of people. Douglas was faced with assessing not just ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s 
cotton crops but his ginneries, arable farms, orchards, stables, livestock farms and 
spinning facilities.
85
 The audit also coincided with a religious festival, revealing the 
collision of their host’s religious, political and financial interests. Rollo Bolton, 
representing White Nile Province at the audit, reported to his superiors that 
‘prayers were attended by a large crowd of devotees’: 
 
It later transpired that … letters had gone out far and wide urging 
Mahdist sympathisers to be present at Abba at this particular 
festival. Sayed Abdel Rahman was then supposed to reveal 
himself as the Nebi Eisa, or prophet Jesus. Sudan Government 
Headquarters despatched a gun-boat to convey Sayed Abdel 
Rahman back to his town house in the capital. I had difficulty in 
persuading pilgrims to return home and Richard Palmer, … the 
Resident of Northern Nigeria, came to Kosti to arrange with me 
how best to affect [sic] the return of his own parishioners.
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Such gatherings were enough to convince many in the Khartoum administration 
that, despite repeated protestations of loyalty, ‘Mahdism was still a potential 
danger and needed to be watched’.
87
 
 
Formal launch of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī 
All that remained, in business terms, was to bring together all these disparate and 
burgeoning ventures under official licence. Its first incarnation, as a loose 
conglomerate of interests known informally as the Dā’irat al-Mahdī, had existed 
in recognisable form as early as 1925, when it was registered under the 
Companies Ordinance of the same year.
88
 On 18 December 1933, however, the 
Dā’ira was formally relaunched at a ceremony in Omdurman, with its Articles of 
Association specifically stating that the company was duly registered under the 
newer Business Registration Act 1931.
89
 
 
 
Front: N.R. Udal, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī and ʿAlī al-Mahdī, March 1930 
(SAD.778/13/6) 
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 According to Ṣalāh Ḥassan, author of a biographical study of ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl, it 
was ‘the expansion of the business that made a redistribution of the work 
hierarchy imperative’ – although he also refers to ‘circumstantial mishaps’ in the 
relationship between ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl and his uncle that led the younger man to 
resign his position.
90
 As for the British, the decision to license the company, 
according to Fatima Babiker Mahmoud, was again deliberately political, the latest 
attempt to ‘contain Sayid Abdel Rahman within the colonial regime through the 
favoured status he would acquire by engaging in business activities’.
91
 
al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq, author of the only published article on 
the Dā’irat al-Mahdī, describes its ‘special significance’ in exclusively political 
terms: it was, he says, ‘set up in response to the political struggle that 
accompanied the advent of British colonial rule, together with the attempts of 
Imam ʿAbd-al-Raḥman to revive the spirit of Mahdīsm among its followers and 
faithful’.
92
 But was there not an irony, if not hypocrisy, in the son of the Mahdī – 
who despised worldly wealth – setting up the biggest Sudanese-owned business 
in the country? ʿAbd-al-Raḥman, now 48 years old, said that the rationale for the 
creation of the company went far deeper than this ‘imposing economic edifice’: 
 
Its perspective was inspired by the teaching in Islam that private 
property without a social function is not permissible. … The Dā’ira 
was set up as a collective, in which both migrants – muhājirīn – 
and settled followers – Anṣār – make their contributions. The 
Dā’ira is an economic institution whose business is carried out by 
men of zeal, who appreciate that it functions not for their 
personal interests but with the twin objectives of spiritual 
development and patriotism.
93
 
 
There are many stories attesting to the social welfare aspect of the Dā’irat al-
Mahdī. There were donations to religious and secular schools, libraries and 
mosques.
94
 A typical anecdote concerns Ḥassan Bileil, later Governor of Sudan’s 
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Central Bank, whose father, a train driver, was killed in a workplace accident. 
When ʿAbd-Al-Raḥman heard of the tragedy, he gave the family a monthly salary, 
which Ḥassan Bileil only stopped drawing when he graduated from university. 
Another anecdote compares ʿAbd-Al-Raḥman’s famed generosity to artists, poets 
and singers with the notorious stinginess of ʿAli al-Mīrghanī. When the poet Wad 
al-ʿUbeiḍ went to ʿAli al-Mīrghanī to complain of his dire financial situation, the 
Khatmīa leader responded with a pious recitation of the fātiha. When Wad al-
ʿUbeiḍ then appeared before ʿAbd-Al-Raḥman, the imām instructed his secretary 
to give him some money even before the poet had time to make his appeal. 
Hence the Wad al-ʿUbeiḍ saying: ‘The fātiha of Abū-Elwa was cashed by Abū-Abda 
[both nicknames]’.
95
 More seriously, as late as 1958, ʿAbd-Al-Raḥman stated 
explicitly: 
 
Know you that the Dā’irat al-Mahdī is an economic foundation, 
the purpose of which is securing the religious and social aims of 
the Anṣār. I have issued instructions to its Director … to exert his 
efforts to open mosques and institutes and preserve the entity of 
the Anṣār and to work towards their welfare.
96
 
 
In its first decade, i.e. before receiving its official licence, the Dā’ira’s expansion 
often flirted with illegality. Even four years after incorporation, the Jazīra Abā 
scheme still had more than 300 acres of ‘unauthorised planted area’.
97
 But the 
British were content to turn a blind eye, offering ‘generous support regarding the 
business and growth of the Dā’ira …  with the aim of initiating a particular social 
and economic balancing act in the Sudan of that time’.
98
 The Dā’ira’s 
administrative sub-divisions proliferated. The original Agricultural Company was 
divided into the White Nile Company for Agricultural Schemes and the al-Nīlein 
Agricultural Company. At its peak, the Real Estate Company owned 811,711 sq. 
metres of property. And, most diverse of all, the Commercial Company presided 
over the sale of cotton, sorghum and livestock, administered the zakāt, ran the 
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Rabak Ginning Mill and bought a controlling stake in the Haḍārat al-Sūdān 
newspaper.
99
 
By 1939, in the words of the colonial expert Margery Perham, Jazīra Abā 
was ‘stamped with the unromantic mathematical pattern of irrigation’.
100
 Such 
geometric designs also covered increasingly large areas on the east and west 
banks of the White Nile on either side of the island, an expansion that peaked in 
the mid-1940s. The largest plantations were on Jazīra Abā itself (30,000 acres) and 
at al-Malāḥa (18,300 acres).
101
 Smaller farms included 1,400 acres apiece at al-
Shawwāl and al-Ṭawīla, and 1,200 acres at Qullī. There were many more besides, 
at Qundāl in Blue Nile Province, at Abū-Halīma near Khartoum, some as far north 
as Berber – altogether totalling 38,400 acres.
102
 As for the water supply, William 
Luce, then in the District Commissioner’s office at Kosti, left us a precise chart of 
all the main growing areas and their irrigation systems.
103
 
 
A family business 
While ʿAbd-al-Raḥman was inevitably the focus of official attention, the Dā’ira 
was far from a one-man operation. Close family were indispensible. Indeed, the 
company’s Articles of Association state that the founding directors were four: 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman; his one surviving brother, ʿAlī al-Mahdī; his nephew, ʿAbdullāhi 
al-Fāḍl; and another nephew, al-Fāḍl al-Bushra.
104
 
In the normal run of things, the older brother would expect to be the 
heir, temporal and spiritual. But after his release from prison in Rashīd in Egypt, 
ʿAlī refrained from contesting the role of imām, opting instead for a quiet life in 
the colonial civil service. He resigned in 1926 to work full-time for his brother, 
running the fledgling company’s Omdurman office for three years, until he retired 
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to compile an oral history of their father’s movement.
105
 ‘We came out of Kararī 
[the Battle of Omdurman] with no hope,’ wrote one follower; ‘there were two 
sons of the Mahdī, close in age. But ʿAlī saw that his brother was more capable 
and gave way. Imagine if he had fought, where would the Anṣār be?’
106
 
ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl’s role was even more pivotal. He was among the best-
educated of the family, first at the Gordon College in Khartoum and then at Abū-
Harāz Agricultural School near Sennār. In later life, he recalled the lack of options 
that led him, in 1916, to consider enrolling in the Sudan Defence Force. When he 
asked his uncle for permission, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman begged him instead to help him 
build the community. ‘I thought he was a dreamer,’ ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl said, 
‘because we had no money then, him or me – but he saw what I didn’t see.’
107
 
And so he gave his uncle 45 years of loyal service as his primary wakīl, or legal 
representative – continuing even after his resignation as Director-General in 
December 1933 – and he passed on his technical farming expertise to Dā’ira 
employees through training manuals and irrigation charts. 
It was ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl who headed the business in its early years – i.e. 
before its formal existence as the licensed Dā’irat al-Mahdī – as the company’s 
first Director-General. As such, his responsibilities included: personnel transfers; 
supervision of all company agents, including their reports and correspondence; 
oversight of revenue collection from the various schemes; monitoring of cotton 
prices; and crop sales.
108
 He presided over a professionally run business. An 
outline of its organisational structure lists by name an eleven-member Board of 
Deputy directors, a Director-General of Schemes, three Agricultural Inspectors, 
twenty-seven Scheme Managers, fourteen Scheme Supervisors, fifty-five 
Accountants and Auditors, ten Mechanical Engineers for Pumps and Vehicles, 
seven Architects, and thirteen Administrators and Clerks.
109
 
The plantation at Jazīra Abā itself provided the template into which these 
personnel fitted. In its early phases, it was divided into three schemes: al-Ṭayyiba, 
al-Raḥmanīa and Dār al-Salām. Each had a Scheme Manager (mudīr al-mashrūʿ), 
answerable directly to ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl and passing instructions down to their 
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own Supervisors (nuẓār). In the Dār al-Salām scheme in 1934, for example, al-
Sheikh ʿAbdallah al-Madanī oversaw supervisors and subordinate staff on four 
separate farms.
110
 
 
The Umma Party: completing the ‘triangle of power’ 
As early as the late 1920s, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī had begun gathering around 
him a second following: a coterie through which, in Tim Niblock’s words, ‘the 
attitudes and objectives of educated Sudanese (especially those of the senior 
graduates) were shaped and influenced by the religious/commercial 
establishment’.
111
 This process culminated in the formation of the Anṣār’s political 
wing, the Umma Party, in May 1945.
112
 
At the formal opening of the Umma Club in Omdurman, the heir 
apparent, al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman, was very much in the frame. It is safe to 
assume that the Umma’s founding aims reflected those of the man holding the 
purse-strings: 
 
The principle of the Party is “The Sudan for the Sudanese” and its 
object is “to work for the independence of the Sudan within its 
recognised geographical frontiers while preserving friendly 
relations with Great Britain and Egypt.” … What prompted us to 
form this Party was an urgent feeling that the time had come for 
responsible indigenous Sudanese opinion to organise itself and 
make the real wishes of the vast majority of the Sudanese known 
to the world, so that the foolish and irresponsible clamour of a 
minority that have been won over by propaganda from outside 
the Sudan should not be taken as an expression of genuine 
Sudanese feeling and exploited as such by Egypt.
113
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Opening of the Umma Club, Omdurman, May 1945 
(SAD.747/4/26) 
 
The political scene in pre-independence Sudan was certainly much more complex 
than the conventional description of a sectarian divide between the Anṣār and the 
Khatmīa.
114
 It was true that many Khatmīa adherents feared that Britain was 
preparing to hand power to the Umma Party. Some even feared Sayyid ʿAbd-al-
Raḥman’s monarchic aspirations. As a result, they pursued a link with Egypt – as, 
indeed, did some politicians who neither followed the Khatmīa nor opposed the 
Anṣār. Some, like the Ashiqqa, sought subordination to the Egyptian monarchy. 
The various strands evolved into two coalitions, the Independence Front and the 
pro-unity National Front. As always, British officialdom dithered, belatedly looking 
to the Socialist Republican Party as a vehicle to achieve Sudanese self-rule, 
possibly with dominion status but without indigenous sectarian labels.
115
 
It is hard to disentangle the web of loyalties that made up the Umma 
Party, but it was a clever blend of family, business partners and sympathetic tribal 
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leaders. In a list of the party’s paltry 23 members in the First Parliament of 1954-
8, Tim Niblock reveals that more than half had largely commercial credentials, 
many of which meshed with family ties: 
 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman ʿUmar ʿAbdallah: employee of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī 
Aḥmad al-Amīr Maḥmūd: owner of a pump scheme; son of a 
prominent Mahdist leader 
Bannaga Muḥammad al-Tūm: substantial tenant on the Gezira 
scheme 
al-Fāḍl al-Bushra: grandson of Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Mahdī 
al-Fāḍl Maḥmūd ʿAbd-al-Karīm: owner of substantial agricultural 
schemes; grandson of Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Mahdī 
Ibrāhīm Idrīs Habbāni: owner of agricultural schemes and 
commercial enterprises 
Imām DafaʿAllah: substantial tenant on the Gezira scheme 
Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl: son of ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl
 
al-Mahdī; 
owner of pump schemes and commercial enterprises
 
Muḥammad ʿAbd-al-Baqī al-Makāshfī: prominent merchant; son of 
a religious leader 
Muṣṭafa Ḥassan Muḥammad: merchant with trading interests 
covering the Western Sudan 
ʿUthmān Ishāq ʿAdam: merchant, with a trading interest in Kutum 
al-Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī: general manager of the Dā’irat 
al-Mahdī
 
 
Yaʿqūb Hāmid Bābikr: prominent merchant; owner of a contracting 
business
116
 
 
In this new context the function of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī was overtly political. al-
Ṣiddīq ʿAbd-al-Raḥman Azraq states baldly that ‘the advancement of farmers’ was 
no longer the focus of the Anṣār’s ‘theoretical drive or programmed vision’ when 
it came to using the ‘economic mechanisms of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī’.
117
 One small 
but vivid illustration of that specific function came in a message from an official in 
Kosti in October 1948, ahead of a big political demonstration in the capital: ‘The 
Daira have been most unusually anxious and pressing [me] to write out a permit 
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for enough petrol to send five lorries up from Aba loaded with chaps to 
Khartoum. I have resisted this and said it is unjustifiable [what] with there being a 
train.’
118
 
Put simply, the defining role of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī – and its greatest 
legacy – was its financing of the independence movement. That role nearly 
destroyed the family finances. After all, the Egyptian government was bankrolling 
a huge pro-unity drive and it was left to the Dā’ira to counter it alone. When he 
was taken to task by the Egyptian journalist Muḥammad Ḥassanein Heikal for 
toadying to the British, ʿAbd-al-Raḥman likened the moribund Condominium to an 
Egyptian hantūr, or horse-drawn cart: ‘Would you expect me to talk to the horse 
or to the driver?’
119
 But by 1954, on the eve of independence and after a 
traumatic election defeat at the hands of the unionists, he was forced to beg the 
British for a loan of up to eight million Egyptian pounds, with all his property put 
up as security, simply to ‘offset the Egyptian money pouring in’.
120
 
 
The end of the Dā’ira 
ʿAbd-al-Raḥman did not live long after independence – long enough, however, to 
see democracy overthrown by General Ibrāhīm ʿAbbūd in the first of Sudan’s post-
independence military coups. His death in March 1959 marked a crucial turning-
point in the history of the family – and the nation. ‘Politically,’ noted an obituary 
in The Times, ‘his death is an event of the highest importance and in a country 
already showing signs of extensive instability its repercussions will need to be 
carefully watched. … The Mahdi’s family are a strongly united clan and this fact 
may be the best guarantee of stability.’
121
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Anṣār mourners at ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-Mahdī’s funeral, Omdurman, March 1959 
(SAD.747/7/6) 
 
Three top jobs were up for contention: imām of the religious community, 
Director-General of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī and leader of the Umma Party. Did 
ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl, only son of ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’s older brother, expect to inherit 
the leadership of the Anṣār after more than four decades of loyal service? His 
family insists that he bowed out gracefully, receiving a Cadillac by way of thanks 
from al-Ṣiddīq.
122
 Other followers contest that version. According to one account, 
at the height of the argument over succession, the Deputy Chief Justice, 
Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Nūr, an emissary trying to bring the two sides together, 
wept openly as he quoted the defeated ʿAbdullāhi al-Fāḍl: ‘My mission in this 
world is to destroy the house of Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman’.
123
 
So al-Ṣiddīq, who had learned at the side of his father for his entire adult 
life, secured the triple inheritance. Would he have maintained the cohesion of the 
clan if he had not died of a heart attack in 1961, at the age of 49?
124
 Admirers 
believe he could have been a towering force for good.
125
 ‘Intelligent and wise,’ 
wrote the journalist Muḥammad Kheir al-Badawī, ‘had he lived he would have 
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been greater than his father – or even his grandfather.’ He cites an example: 
when the Anṣār clashed with ʿAbbūd’s troops at the Prophet’s birthday (mawlid 
al-Nabī) celebrations in Omdurman, with blood shed on both sides, his followers 
begged him to authorise a mass uprising. al-Ṣiddīq said: ‘The Anṣār were 
entrusted to me, and by God I shall not leave them to be killed. Shame on me if I 
meet my God and a single drop of Anṣār blood has been spilt in vain on my 
orders.’
126
 Put in less emotional language to the Daily Telegraph, al-Ṣiddīq said: ‘I 
am the only man in this country who could raise a war or a rebellion [against the 
military] … but I would not do it.’
127
 
al-Ṣiddīq’s death was the beginning of the clan’s disintegration. 
Presciently, he had stipulated in his will that a five-man council from the 
immediate family should select his successor – a selection that must then be 
endorsed by the Anṣār.
128
 But the succession of al-Hādī, al-Ṣiddīq’s younger 
brother, prompted a split with al-Ṣiddīq’s son, al-Ṣādiq. al-Hādī became imām, al-
Ṣādiq divided the Umma Party, and the Dā’irat al-Mahdī staggered on, struggling 
with the massive debts built up over years of political struggle. When the end 
came, it brought al-Hādī’s end, too: another military coup, this time led by Jāʿfar 
Nimeiri in 1969, and another, much larger armed confrontation between Sudan’s 
new rulers and the Anṣār at Jazīra Abā. In the approving words of Anthony 
Sylvester, ‘It was Nimeiri who put an end to their power.’
129
 
Two Arabic phrases sum up the demise of the Dā’irat al-Mahdī in the 
summer of 1970: al-ḥirāsat al-ʿamm, ‘general sequestration’, and al-islāh al-zirāʿa, 
‘agricultural reform’.
130
 Aḥmad Suleimān, Minister of Economics and Foreign 
Trade in Nimeiri’s Revolutionary Government, said the sweeping programme of 
nationalisation and confiscation was designed ‘so that in the end our people may 
reap the benefits that were going to a handful of merchants.’
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 New laws to 
speed up the process were bolstered by a Central Bureau for Public Control Act.
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A clash was not long in coming. Details of the brief but violent conflict are 
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contested: as Mansūr Khālid has put it, ‘the Ansar tend to exaggerate their losses, 
while authority tends to exaggerate Ansar armaments’.
133
 But there were 
certainly many thousands of deaths in the government bombing and strafing of 
Jazīra Abā, and the new imām, al-Hādī ʿAbd-al-Raḥman, was killed in murky 
circumstances during an escape bid for the Ethiopian border: yet another member 
of the al-Mahdī clan who died short of his 50
th
 birthday. 
As for the Dā’irat al-Mahdī, it died in 1970. Company records and 
archives were destroyed when the company was confiscated. Family properties 
were eventually reinstated but the agricultural heart of the operation, built up so 
painstakingly by ʿAbd-al-Raḥman, had been ripped out. Agricultural ‘reform’ 
turned out to be agricultural paralysis: with the death of the big private schemes 
on the White Nile, planted land today is estimated to be less than 5 per cent of 
what it once was.
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 But Jazīra Abā still retains its place as the heartland of the 
movement. The Anṣār – those at least that have not been co-opted by Sudan’s 
latest military-led autocracy – still hope that they will see a day when they reclaim 
a place in the running of the country. It is unlikely, however, to match the weight 
of the contribution made by the great clan patriarch, Sayyid ʿAbd-al-Raḥman al-
Mahdī, and his Dā’irat al-Mahdī. 
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